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captured by a British warship after the outbreak of
war between Great Britain and Germany, and \Vas taken
into Gibraltar, "rhere she 'vas condemned. 'fhe goods in
question, of which there were 31 packages, \vere reshipped
in the British steamship Simla, and were seized on January 27, 1915, by the collector of customs in the port of
London, after the arrival of the Simla in the 'fhames.
HAROLD MuRPHY, for the procurator general. A.rticle 1
of the Eleventh I-Iague Convention, \vhich provides that
"The postal correspondence, \vhether of neutrals or of
belligerents, and whether its character is official or private, found at sea in a ship, whether neutral or enemy, is
inviolable," does not apply to parcels sent by parcel post.
Herr l(riege, the German delegate at the conference, who
proposed this particular regulation, explained that" postal
correspondence" was not intended to include parcels.
(See vVestlake's International Law, volume 2 (2d ed.), p .
..185) and Oppenheim's International La,v, volume 2 (2d
ed.), p. 237.)
SIR SAMUEL EvANS (the president). There is no one
here to suggest that these goods are inviolable?
No; there has been no communication at all, and no
appearance has been entered.
SrR SAI\;IUEL EvANS (the president). Very well. There
· IS no appearance, and I order that the goods be conden1ned.
THE "SOUTHFIELD."
[Admiralty in prize.]
Sir Samuel Evans (the president). July 5, 15, 1915.
1 Trehern, British and Colonial Prize Cases, 332.

SUIT FOR CONDEMNATION OF CARGO AS PRIZE.
Statement of the
case.

On July 16, 1914, the British steamship Southfield left
Novorossiisk, a Russian Black Sea port, vlith a cargo of
barley shipped by Wiilker & Co., a firm of German merchants, and consigned "to order, Emden."
On July 20, one J. R. Heukers, a Dutch merchant,
carrying on business at Groningen in Holland, bought
197,000 kilos of the barley and took up the documents
on July 27; and, by contracts of sale dated July 24 and
25, one Wilhelm Barghoorn, another Dutch Inerchant,
bought other portions of the cargo amounting to 200,000
kilos, the property in \Vhich \Vas transferred to him on
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July 29 and 31. Both merchants at once resold to customers of their own.
War broke out between Great Britain and Germany on
August 4, and on August 8, when the Southfield put into
Plymouth, she was diverted to Portsmouth \Vhere the
cargo was seized as prize. The vessel was then sent
round to London \Vhere the cargo was discharged and
sold, and the proceeds paid into court.
The two Dutch merchants claimed the release of the
proceeds of their goods on the ground that they became
purchasers before the outbreak of the war, and \vith no
kno,vledge or expectation of the outbreak of war.
July 15. Sir SAMUEL EvANS (the president). The sit~~ods in
questions arising for decision depend upon the effect of
the intervention of a state of war upon the rights of capture of a belligerent in respect of goods sold by an enemy
to a neutral while the goods and the ship in \Yhich they
are laden are in transitu.
The goods consisted of quantities of barley shipped
before the war at a Russian port upon a British ship and
consigned to a German port. During the voyage the
goods were sold by enemy merchants to neutral merchants-namely, to two Dutch merchants-Heukers and
Barghoorn, carrying on business at Groningen. The
transactions relating to the sale to I-Ieukers fell within
the period from July 20 to July 28, 1914, and those
relating to the sale to Barghoorn within the last week in
July, 1914. Apart from any question depending upon
the intervention of war it is not disputed that the property in the goods had passed to the neutral purchasers
before the capture.
The contention of the Crown \Vas that \Vhen \Var \Vas w~~tbreak
declared betv¥een this country and Germany on August
4, 1914, the goods, \vhich were still in transitu, became
subject to capture by the Crown, and were confiscable at
the time of the capture and seizure on August 8, not,vithstanding the prior sales to the neutrals, on the ground
that at the time of such sales war \Vas imminent or in
contemplation of the enerny vendors.
It is important to examine closely the principle \vhich
governs the right of capture of goods transferred in
transitu and to ascertain accurately its limits, as it is
sometimes apt to be loosely stated.
In order to deduce the rule, it 'vill be sufficient, I
think, to refer to t\vo leading cases and to one authorized
textbook. I take them in order of date.
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In the Vrow lJfargaretha (1 C. Rob. 336, at p. 337; 1
Eng. P. C. 149, at p. 151) Lord Sto\vell pronounces upon
io:.towell's optn- the subject as follo\vs: "In the ordinary course of things
in time of peace-for it is not denied that such a contract may be made and effectually made (according to
the usage of merchants)-such a transfer in transitu
might certainly be made. It has even been contended
that a mere delivering of the bill of lading is a transfer of
the property. But it might be more correctly expressed,
perhaps, if said that it transfers only the right of delivery;
but that a transfer of the bill of lading, with a contract
of sale accompanying it, may transfer the property in
the ordinary course of things so as effectually to bind the
parties and all others can. not \Veil be doubted. vVhen
war intervenes another rule is set up by courts of admiralty which interferes 'vith the ordinary practice. In
a state of war, existing or imminent, it is held that the
property shall be deemed to continue as it was at the
time· of shipment till the actual delivery; this arises out
of the state of war, which gives a belligerent a right to
stop the goods of his enemy. If such a rule did not
exist, all goods shipped in an enemy's country would be
protected by transfers vvhich it would be impossible to
detect. It is on that principle held, I believe, as a general rule, that property can not be converted in transitu,
and in that sense I recognize it as the rule of this court.
But this arises, as I have said, out of a state of \Var
which creates new rights in other parties, and can not be
applied to transactions originating, like this, in a time of
peace."
story's opi n In the work of 1'1r. Justice Story on the Principles and
ion.
Practice of Prize Courts, tha,t celebrated jurist states the
rule in the following passage (Pratt's Edition, pp. 64-65):
"In respect to the proprietary interests in cargoes, though,
in general, the rules of the common lavv apply, yet there
are many peculiar principles of prize la\V to be considered; it is a general rule that, during hostilities, or
imminent and impending danger of hostilities, the property of parties belligerent can not change its national
character during the voyage, or, as it is commonly
expressed, in transitu. 'fhis rule equally applies to ships
and cargoes; and it is so inflexible that it is not relaxed,
even in owners who become subjects by capitulation after
the shipment and before the capture. * * * The
same distinction is. applied to purchases made by neu-
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trals of property in transitu, if purchased during a state
of war existing or imminent, and impending danger of
war, the con~ract is held invalid, and the property is
deemed to continue as it was at the time of shipment until
the actual delivery. It is otherwise, however, if a contract be made during a state of peace, and without
contemplation of war; for, under such circumstances, the
prize courts will recognize the contract and enforce the
title acquired under it. * * * The reason why
courts of admiralty have established this rule as to transfers in transitu during a state of war or expected war,
is asserted to be, that if such a rule did not exist all goods
shipped in the enemy's country would be protected by
transfers, which it would be impossible to detect."
Lastly, in the Baltica (11 Moo. P. C. 141; 2 Eng. P. C. op~\~J.sd o wn ~ s
628) in the judgment of the lords of the privy council,
sitting to hear appeals in prize, Lord Kingsdown (then
Mr. Pemberton Leigh) deals with the rule as applicable to
ships and goods in the following passages: "The general
rule is open to no doubt. A neutral, while a war is
imminent, or after it has commenced, is at liberty
to purchase either goods or ships (not being ships of
'var) from either belligerent, and the purchase is valid,
\Vhether the subject of it be lying in a neutral port or in an
enemy's port. During a time of peace, without prospect
of war, any transfer which is sufficient to transfer the
property between the vendor and vendee is good also
against a captor if war afterwards unexpectedly breaks
out. But, in case of war, either actual or imminent, this
rule is subject to qualification, and it is settled that in
such case a mere transfer by documents which would be
sufficient to bind the parties is not sufficient to change
the property as against captors as long as the ship or
goods remain in transitu.
''With respect to these principles, their lordships are
not a"\vare that it is possible to raise any controversy ;
they are the familiar rules of the English prize courts,
established by all the authorities, and are collected and
stated, principally from the decisions of Lord Stowell, by
Mr. Justice Story, in his Notes on the Principles an d
Practice of Prize Courts, a work \Vhich has been selected
by the British Government for the use of its naval officers
as the best code of instruction in the prize la\\". 'l'he
59650-24--3
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passages referred to are to be found in pages 6:3, 64, of
that "'"ork.
"In order to determine the question, it is necessary to
consider upon \\;~hat principle the rule rests, and \Vhy
it is that a sale "\vhich would be perfectly good if made
while the property was in a neutral port, or \Vhile it \\"as
in an enemy's port, is ineffectual if made ·while the ship
is on her voyage from one port to the other. 1'here
seem to be but two possible grounds of distinction. 'l'he
one is, that while the ship is on the seas, the title of the
vendee can not be cornpleted by actual delivery of the vessel or goods; the other is, that the ship and goods, having
incurred the risk of capture by putting to sea, shall not be
permitted to defeat the inchoate right of capture by the
belligerent po\vers until the voyage is at an end.
"The former, how·ever, appears to be the true ground
on which the rule rests. Such transactions during \Var,
or in contemplation of vtar, are so likely to be merely
colorable, to be set up for the purpose of misleading or
defrauding captors, the difficulty of detecting such
frauds, if n1ere paper transfers are held sufficient, is so
great that the courts have laid down as a general rule
that such transfers, \Vithout actual delivery, shall be
insufficient; that in order to defeat the captors, the possession, as well as the property, must be changed before
the seizure. It is true that, in one sense, the ship and
goods may be said to be in transitu till they have reached
their original port of destination; but their lordships
have found no case where the transfer was held to be
inoperative after the actual delivery of the property
to the owner" (11 Moo. P. C., at pp. 145-146; 2 Eng.
P. C., at pp. 630-632).
'l'ransfersin
It might be argued that according t.o these authorities
transitu.
transfers in transitu are invalid against belligerent
captors upon the intervention of war unless there is actual
delivery before capture; or, in other \VOrds, that if \Var
has intervened no transfer by documents alone can
defeat the right of capture. But, in my opinion, that
proposition is too wide, and is not an accurate delimitation of the true rule. In the passages cited IJord Sto,vell
speaks of "a state of \Var existing or itn1ninene' .: l\1r.
Justice Story of "a state of peace, \Yithout conten1plation
of \Vu.r," and of "a state of war existing or imn1in('nt,
und impending danger of \Var": and Lord I\:.ingsdo\\''11 of
"\va.r, either actual or in1n1inont," or "'vn.r nncxpect.edly
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breaking out" (contrasting it with "a time of peace,
without prospect of war"), and of "transactions during
war or in con tern pla tio n of war.''
It is important to note the reasons for the rule which are
elaborated by Lord Kingsdo\vn thus [his lordship repeated
the passage set out above, beginning "Such transactions
during war," and continued]: In my vie'v the elen1ent
that the vendor conten1.plated war, and had the design
to make the transfer in order to secure himself and to
attempt to defeat the rights of belligerent captors, is
necessarily involved in the rule which invalidates such
transfers. Sales of goods upon ships afloat are now of
such co1n1non occurrence in commerce that it would be
too harsh a rule to treat such transfers as invalid unless
such an element existed.
I have been considering the rule in its application to London.
Declaration
the sale or transfer of goods, but it is \Vell to note that
special and highly artificial rules as to the transfer of
vessels during or preceding a state of 'var are now laid
do,vn in the declaration of I.~ondon of 1909-as agreed
to by the representatives of the powers, and as applied
by the orders in council in this country. But thesP do
not apply to goods or merchandise .
. -\s
. to the facts in these t\vo cases, it is abundantly
clear that the neutral purchasers acted with complete
bona fides throughout; they paid for the goods, and resold
them to neutral customers of their own before war was
declared. This 'vould not necessarily conclude the
Jnatter.
But I an1. also satisfied that the vendors did not have
the war between their country and this country (to
\Vhich the ship carrying the goods belonged) in con templation 'vhen they sold the goods. The imminence of
war between Germany and Russia has no materiality in
considering these cases. In the light of after events, the
war \vith this country may be spoken of as having been
imminent, regarded from the point of vie\\-'" of time, in
the last two weeks of July; but there is no evidence that
it was regarded as i1n1ninen t in its proper meaning of
"threatening or about to occur" by German merchants at
that time; not only so, but I find, after investigation in
various directions, and on grounds 'vhich I deem satisfactory, that it 'vas not in fact so regarded by them.
What the hidden anticipation of the Government of
the German Empire might have been upon the subject
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it is not for me to speculate; but I may express my
humble opinion that our intervention in the 'var upon
the invasion of Belgium in defense of treaty obligations,
against the breach of such obligations by the invaders,
'vas a complete surprise even to their Government.
Documents and facts 'vhich throw light upon the
history of the days I have been dealing 'vith between
July 24 and August 4, 1914, are, I think, admirably
collected and stated in a -vvork called the liistory of
T\velve Days, by Mr. J. W. Headlam.
On the grounds that the German vendors had no
thought of the imminence of war between Germany and
this country, and did not have such a war in contemplation at any time while the transactions of sale were taking
place or before they were completed, I hold that the
sales to the t'vo Dutch merchants were valid, and that
the goods were not confiscable. And I decree the release
to then1 respectively of the net proceeds of the sale of
their respective goods, 'vhich are now in court.

Decision .

THE " GLITRA."
July 30, 1915.
1 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts, 34.

In the prize matter concerning the English steamer
Glitra, with Leith as her home port, the imperial superior
prize court in Berlin, at its sitting of July 30, 1916, has
found as follows:
Decision.

The appeals lodged by the plaintiffs under Nos. 9 to 12 of the decision
are rejected as inadmissible; the appeals of the remaining plaintiffs
are denied as unfounded.
The costs of the proceedings in appeal are to be borne by the plaintiffs.
REASONS.

On October 20, 1914, the steamer Glitra, belonging to
the firm of Salversent & Co., of Leith, with a general
cargo on the vvay from Leith to Stavanger, was brought
to by a submarine, and after the cre'v had left the ship
she "\Vas sunk, together with her cargo.
re~~~ti~~s. prize
In answer to the summons of the prize court issued in
accordance 'vith section 26 of the prize court regulations,
the 13 parties interested in the cargo submitted claims
for compensation for damages due to the destruction of
their merchandise. The plaintiffs are members of Nor'vegian firms; the plain tiff figuring in claim No. 2 alone .
Statement

thecase.
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